Integrating Geodesign and game experiments for negotiating urban development by Lenferink, S. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/162876
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-07 and may be subject to
change.
Integrating 
geodesign and game 
experiments for 
negotiating urban 
development
SANDER LENFERINK, GUSTAVO ARCINIEGAS, ARY 
SAMSURA, LINDA CARTON
Lenferink, S., Arciniegas, G., Samsura, A., & Carton, L. (2016). Integrating Geodesign and game 
experiments for negotiating urban development. Research In Urbanism Series, 4(1), 71-92. doi:10.7480/
rius.4.844
R
IU
S 4: G
EO
-D
ESIG
N
72
Abstract
In this article we explore an expansion of geodesign to analyze processes of 
competition and cooperation by combining it with game-theoretical modelling 
and experiments. We test the applicability of facilitating these two fields in an 
integrated workshop by analysing the case study of oversupply of development 
sites in the Liemers corridor. Two workshops were held, with representatives 
of the six municipalities involved and with the regional and provincial 
authority, in which participants negotiated over the distribution of the supply 
of development sites. The workshops were performed around an interactive 
MapTable, with spatial information (from GIS) and financial information (from 
the game-theoretical model) being visualized in real-time. The integrated 
workshops were assessed to discover differences in terms of process and 
outcomes, and they examine whether and how learning takes place. We 
conclude that the combination of game theory and geodesign provides added 
value for planning support by facilitating a realistic discussion, and negotiation 
that is strongly connected to real-life locations, and by aiming at designing a 
common, collaborative solution. Through the integrated workshop learning 
about the problem of oversupply in financial and geographical terms and also 
about each other’s motives and behaviour is stimulated.
KEYWORDS
Planning Support Systems (PSS); Geodesign; Spatial development; Collaborative planning; Negotiation 
game; Housing; Business areas
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1. INTRODUCTION
After being widely introduced during the 2009 Annual ESRI International 
User Conference in San Diego, California, the concept of geodesign has at-
tracted a lot of attention from different fields of study including geography, 
planning, landscape architecture, and environmental studies. The emphasis 
of geodesign has been on the entire design processes in geographical envi-
ronments through stakeholder participation and collaboration with the aid of 
technology (Goodchild, 2010). 
In this article we explore the application of an expansion of geodesign 
as an approach to analyse the cooperation and competition process among 
stakeholders by integrating the technique of spatial visualization with help of 
Planning Support Systems (PSS) with game-theoretical modelling and simu-
lation in a workshop. We applied this approach in a case of regional planning 
with, at present, supply-led provision of sites for urban development in the 
Netherlands. At the moment, many Dutch municipalities experience prob-
lems of oversupply of plans for development sites caused by the increase of 
competition between municipalities and of the degree of inter-urban frag-
mentation as a result of the crisis in the financial and land market. 
Since the combination of geodesign and game theory is still rare, in this 
article we aim to test the applicability of facilitating these two fields in an 
integrated workshop. In order to do so, we will first describe the theoreti-
cal background in the next section. Afterwards, the institutional setting and 
context of the project are described, followed by further elaboration of the 
analytical framework, the game theory model and the setup of the integrat-
ed geodesign-game-experiment workshops. Subsequently, the experiences 
with the workshops will be presented and discussed in more detail. Finally, 
we will provide our conclusions and some recommendations. 
2. GEODESIGN AND GAME THEORY AS CORNERSTONES FOR INTEGRATED STAKEHOLDER 
INTERACTION 
For the integrated workshop, two strands of theory are combined: Ge-
odesign (1) and Game theory (2) on negotiations among stakeholders. In lit-
erature, geodesign is sometimes combined with the methodologies of serious 
games (for instance D’Aquino, Le Page, Bousquet, & Bah, 2003; Vasconcelos 
et al., 2009), but literature on the combination of game theory and geodesign 
is very scarce. This article aims to bring these separated strands together and 
report on an attempt to bridge and combine the two approaches. Therefore, 
this theoretical section will provide a glance into both geodesign and game 
theory. 
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 2.1	 Geodesign	
While Geographic Information Science has a quantitative, rational-ana-
lytic reputation and is therefore criticized under headings like qualitative GIS 
(Cope & Elwood, 2009; Schoepfer & Rogers, 2014) and critical cartography (see 
Crampton & Krygier, 2006), geodesign generally adopts a more qualitative 
approach to facilitating collaboration between stakeholders. 
According to the founder of the well-known framework for geodesign, 
Carl Steinitz, geodesign is an interdisciplinary practice, emerging from the 
collaboration of professionals and stakeholders, working jointly on a shared 
focal spatial problem or place. Steinitz’ framework organizes and supports 
these practices, integrating various approaches and methods. Amongst oth-
ers, the practice of geodesign requires collaboration of design professionals, 
analysts (often with a background in geographical sciences), information 
technologies and ‘people of the place’ (Steinitz, 2012, p. 4-5). 
In an effort to catch the practices under the label of geodesign, the fol-
lowing definition has been formulated: “Geodesign is a design and planning 
method which tightly couples the creation of design proposals with impact 
simulations informed by geographic contexts, systems thinking, and digital 
technology” (Michael Flaxman, 2010, in Steinitz, 2012). In the project de-
scribed in this article, a simulation game is developed and played with stake-
holders, in a way which shows similarities to the approaches and practices 
described as geodesign. In an iterative process, researchers and stakeholders 
work towards representations of real-world landscapes, and modifications in 
its physical structure. A (GIS-based) PSS serves to bring various themes and 
information sets together, and calculate consequences of certain decisions 
‘on the fly’ during deliberations and negotiations. 
 2.2	 Game	theory	for	strategic	decision	behaviour
In short, game theory can be defined as a mathematical approach to 
study strategic behaviour (Myerson, 1991). In game theory a game is an ab-
straction of conflicting and interdependent decision-making situations. With 
its formal and abstract formulations, game theory can be useful to provide 
solid micro-foundations for the study of collective decision-making process-
es and also social interactions, especially related to the competition and co-
operation among stakeholders (Elster, 1982). Furthermore, game theory has 
the potential to improve our understanding of collective action problems by 
describing the basic structure of collective actions, explaining how collective 
actions work and analysing potential outcomes of collective actions (Hardin, 
1971; Aumann, 1985; Ostrom, 1990). 
IN
TEG
R
ATIN
G
 G
EO
D
ESIG
N
 A
N
D
 G
A
M
E EXPER
IM
EN
TS FO
R N
EG
O
TIATIN
G
 U
R
B
A
N
 D
EVELO
PM
EN
T
75
Game theory is not a single method of analysis. Rather, it has numerous 
features for exposing and analysing various interactional structures of stake-
holders in various contexts and dimensions. The various dimensions can in-
clude the number of stakeholders involved, the way in which the stakeholders 
interact, and the availability of information to the stakeholders, and these 
dimensions can notably affect both structure and outcome of stakeholders’ 
interaction activities (Dixit & Skeath, 2004). 
Despite its many advantages, game theory also has many limitations. One 
of them is that some of its basic assumptions are excessively rigid, which may 
give difficulties in its application to complex real-life situations. Related to 
social dilemmas (e.g. public goods provision), many studies and experiments 
have been performed (see e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Bochet et al., 2006). 
However, most of those experiments occurred in laboratory settings involv-
ing undergraduate students at universities (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010). The specificity of such experimental settings raises questions about 
their generalizability and the effect that context may have on experimental 
outcomes, especially when local and spatial settings are crucial, such as in 
the case of supplying development land. Moreover, most local decision-mak-
ers, particularly at the municipal level, are not always taking urban systems 
into consideration when they make their decision: they often only limit their 
concern to their municipal boundaries. By applying a geodesign workshop in 
conducting a game experiment with municipality representatives (“the real 
people of the place”), we might expect that the effectiveness of the experi-
ment will be improved. Not only to observe their strategic decision behaviour 
in a more realistic setting, but it will also provide them with a better decision 
support.
3. CASE STUDY: MUNICIPAL OVERSUPPLY OF DEVELOPMENT SITES
 3.1	 Institutional	setting
In the Netherlands, the planning of urban development primarily is a 
municipal task and responsibility. Municipalities apply zoning plans that 
specify whether and how much development is possible within their bound-
aries. In addition, municipalities attempt to attract investors and private de-
velopers for funding the developments because more development results in 
higher income from taxes. As a consequence, there is a considerable degree 
of competition between municipalities for attracting investors in urban de-
velopment. The provincial government is left with the task to supervise and 
coordinate the municipalities and intervene if necessary. However, provinces 
usually tend to give freedom to the municipalities to plan for urban develop-
ment by themselves. 
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Since the financial and real estate crisis has hit in 2008, it has become 
more important for municipalities in a region, in deliberation with the prov-
ince, to reach a common understanding of the total demand for housing and 
office space; supply of development plans nowadays exceeds the total region-
al demand. If prices of land will drop because this oversupply of development 
plans will be brought to the market, then a ‘Tragedy of the Commons-situa-
tion’ (as originally explained in Hardin, 1968) will become manifest.
Figure 1. Municipalities in the Liemers transport corridor.
 3.2	 Case	description
The case represented in the workshop is a real-world region with a prob-
lem of oversupply of development plans, anno 2014. In this article, we fo-
cus on the provision of locations for urban development in the case of the 
transport corridor between the Dutch cities of Arnhem and Doetinchem, the 
Liemers corridor (Figure 1), in the Eastern part of the Netherlands. In the 
Liemers transport corridor, connected by the A12 and A18 highways and the 
railway line Arnhem-Doetinchem, six municipalities compete by providing 
planned locations for future urban development. As a result of the competi-
tion and the limited demand for urban development at a regional scale, there 
is an oversupply of planned locations which considerably reduces the value of 
the locations (Table 1).
MUNICI-
PALITY
ARNHEM WESTER- 
VOORT
DUIVEN ZEVENAAR MONTFER-
LAND
DOETIN- 
CHEM
TOTAL 
REGIONAL 
SUPPLY
TOTAL 
REGIONAL 
DEMAND
Business 
area (ha)
12,0 3,0 33,5 20,2 27,0 113,0 208,7 120,1
Housing 
(no. 
units)
2000 536 682 1600 2057 2791 9666 8737
Table 1. Supply and demand of business area and housing in the Liemers Corridor until 2040. Based on 
EIB, 2013; IBIS-Province of Gelderland, 2013; Province of Gelderland, 2013.
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The demand for future urban development can be regarded as a common 
pool resource. The six municipalities compete for this resource, and, in do-
ing so, deplete the resource by providing for an oversupply of planned de-
velopment. The solution to this problem can be found in a spontaneous col-
laboration (see Ostrom, 1990; Webster & Lai, 2003). An integrated geodesign 
workshop could provide for decision support to come to collaboration, by in-
creasing insight in the problem at hand, simulation with potential solutions, 
and discussion of potential outcomes (e.g. Geertman, Stillwell, & Toppen, 
2013). The set-up of such integrated workshops is described in greater detail 
in the next section. 
4. METHODOLOGY: THE INTEGRATED GEODESIGN-GAME EXPERIMENT WORKSHOP
 4.1	 Analytical	framework:	Learning	as	a	success	criterion
As geodesign is understood as a team effort, group work criteria come 
into play for a successful project. In order for the workshop in terms of pro-
cess and outcome to be successful, the geodesign team considered learning 
(individual and group learning) as the most important quality criterion for 
evaluating the project’s success. This is in line with Vonk, Geertman & Schot 
(2005) and with Pelzer, Geertman, Van der Heijden, & E. Rouwette (2014) and 
Pelzer & Geertman, 2014), who made a systematic survey of added values of 
Planning Support Systems (PSS), eliciting communication and learning as 
proven, continuous elements, of successful group work with PSS for planning 
and decision-making. As learning should occur across disciplines, the four 
spheres of geodesign (Steinitz, 2012) should be incorporated in such a fash-
ion that an iterative learning environment is created. We will now explain 
how we included these spheres as preconditions for enabling learning in the 
workshop.
The People of the Place sphere: 
The workshop was not meant to simulate ‘any region’ or ‘a fictitious 
problem’, but concerns real stakeholders and a real-world planning problem, 
the oversupply of local development plans. In seeking an understanding of 
what stakeholders with real stakes do and think in weighing intervention di-
lemmas and in considering strategic cooperation and competition with other 
stakeholders in making their (individual and collective) trade-offs, their re-
al-world situation should be represented in a recognizable fashion. A work-
shop setting requires sufficient simplification while remaining dedicated to 
the problem at hand. If the involved stakeholders would not consider it re-
sembling their real-world situation, the developed approach would be con-
sidered a failure.
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Geographic sciences sphere: 
The research team acknowledged that a thorough inventory of plans 
and a trustworthy source of facts and figures would be necessary in order to 
make a valid, representative diagnosis of the problem. Data for preparing the 
workshops was collected with the involved stakeholders: the province, the 
metropolitan region and the six municipalities involved. We recognize the 
need for a thorough understanding of the spatial phenomenon being studied: 
the geography sciences sphere in Steinitz’s spheres scheme. As in geography 
sciences, in this project the approach is premised on the idea to build a model 
based on the present, bearing sufficient accuracy, and then try to move it into 
the future. 
Information technology sphere:
In early discussions about experimenting with decision-making in a 
workshop-setting with real participants, it was the intention that various 
expertises would be integrated. Planning support tools could be used to col-
lect and represent (selective, ‘what if’) geographic information on local plans 
and area characteristics, while also incorporating or linking data on supply 
and demand of housing and business spaces (and related land prices and re-
turns on investment). As the project unfolded, it became clear that the ideas 
for a negotiation game and the automated MapTable approach for visualiz-
ing dynamic simulations should be integrated. The negotiation game soft-
ware would have the built-in pay-off structure of the underlying game-the-
ory model, which calculates the financial consequences of various levels of 
(in-)equilibrium of supply and demand (section 4.2). The MapTable, running 
a dynamic GIS model (section 4.3), could serve as interface between the par-
ticipants and the geographical information, as well as the game theory model 
in order to show financial consequences of decisions in real time. Based on 
previous experiences with collaborative planning and mapping processes and 
the MapTable instrument, there was a clear expectation on what could be rep-
resented in the short, compressed and simplified context typical for a game, 
how GIS visualizations could work in a workshop setting, and what would be 
(im-)possible in a collaborative setting with stakeholders (Mayer, Carton, De 
Jong, Leijten, & Dammers, 2004; Carton, 2007; Carton & Thissen, 2009; Ar-
ciniegas, 2012; Arciniegas & Janssen, 2012).
Design professions sphere:
It is in this sphere that the integrated workshop approach somewhat dif-
fers from that conceived by Steinitz (2012). For this particular project, deal-
ing with an oversupply of plans, the financial-strategic negotiations between 
municipalities as to how to divide a burden of possible reduction of develop-
ment plans, was considered the core issue. The exact outlook of the landscape 
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or the exact choices where spatial development plans should be decreased 
or cancelled, was considered of minor importance, when dealing with the 
strategic interactions among the stakeholders. On the contrary, their mutu-
al negotiations and trade-offs between options of burden sharing, accepting 
losses, competition and cooperation, were found central to the intervention 
part of the geodesign effort. The preparation and execution of the workshops 
aimed at finding creative inter-relational solutions for the stakeholders and 
increasing the understanding of the strategic considerations of stakeholders 
and the workings of supporting approaches and instruments (see also Samsu-
ra, 2014). By offering various potential planning interventions and interven-
tion instruments to the workshop participants in consecutive game rounds, 
incrementally increasing the complexity, creativity would be triggered in a 
step-wise fashion. 
 4.2	 Game	theory	model
The game-theoretical model employed in this study is based on a modi-
fication of N-person prisoners’ dilemma game that was done by constructing 
continuous payoff structure and strategy space to the agents/players. The ba-
sic idea of the game is that subjects or players – who in this study represent-
ed different municipalities in the Liemers transport corridor – individually 
choose how many development sites they are going to supply. With a limited 
demand that is shared among all players, the aggregated supply will affect 
the expected values from developing the sites. It is somewhat indubitable to 
assume that when the aggregate supply exceeds the demand, the value will 
decrease and oppositely, the value will increase when the aggregate supply 
is below the demand. Players will then have to negotiate to adjust their plans 
for development sites. Changes made to the supplies will trigger real-time 
calculations of financial outcomes as values for each municipality involved, 
using the equation: 
!" = 	 %"	(' − %" −) *)  
for	0	≤	xi	≤	si	
In this equation, p_i is the financial outcomes of municipality i, which 
can also be negative. The number of development locations, x, supplied by 
municipality i (in ha) is the only variable to be decided by the players. The 
other variables are given constants and consist of: r, the basic revenue based 
on specific cost and selling prices of every unit of development location in 
that particular municipality (in €); and D, the total demand for development 
locations in the corridor (in ha). When ∑ωx_i , the aggregated supply of devel-
opment locations (in ha), is greater than D (i.e. there is oversupply), c is the 
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reduction factor for the value of the municipalities development sites. Ad-
versely, when ∑ωx_i  is smaller than D (there is undersupply), c is the increas-
ing factor for the value of each development site. Theoretically, the optimum 
level can be calculated by maximizing ∑ωp_i .The constants were gathered and 
calculated based on real data related to the cost and selling price of location 
development for each municipality and also on reports from the province and 
city-region authority that covers the study area (CBS, PBL and Wageningen 
UR, 2013; Cobouw, 2013; EIB, 2013; IBIS-Province of Gelderland, 2013; Province 
of Gelderland, 2013; VU University Amsterdam, 2011). Therefore each munic-
ipality has different values of x, r and c, based on their plans and profiles of 
costs and benefits structure related to their location development. Moreover, 
each municipality also has a maximum supply of development sites, si , based 
on their current development plans. 
 4.3	 MapTable	PSS	workshop	
Two geodesign workshops were organized, in which negotiations between 
the six municipalities were facilitated using financial and geographical data 
on residential and industrial developments. The first workshop was held with 
the regional urban development practitioners working as civil servants in the 
provincial government or city-region authority related to the Liemers trans-
port corridor. In this workshop, we asked the participants to play the role of 
a representative of a municipality in the corridor. The second workshop was 
held with the local urban development practitioners from each of the six mu-
nicipalities in the corridor. Each workshop was held as a semi-controlled ex-
periment. Both workshops were videotaped with the purpose of assessing the 
participants’ statements, observing their physical behaviour, and analysing 
the relation between the two, because people do not always behave according 
to rational principles (Neale & Bazerman, 1985), and the negotiation process 
defines how and why people have their particular way of thinking and acting 
(Rubin and Brown, 1975).
The MapTable PSS
A PSS with a digital map of the corridor area was constructed, which fea-
tured an integration of two main elements: an interactive GIS, a digital touch 
table, called the MapTable, and the game theory model, described above. As 
such, the PSS is a combination of what Schoop (2004) describes as an auto-
mation-oriented system, that tries to find any economic optimum of a nego-
tiation process, and a communication-oriented system, that supports com-
municative processes. The MapTable is a digital touch table of large format 
(46-inch) developed and commercialized by the Dutch firm Mapsup (http://
www.mapsup.nl) designed to support group work around spatial informa-
tion. The PSS was developed within the ESRI ArcGIS® environment using an 
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ArcGIS extension called CommunityViz (http://www.communityviz.com). 
The extension CommunityViz is used to support users performing map-based 
calculations (Walker & Daniel, 2011), showing the results of their decisions 
in real time (Figure 2). The interactive interface and tools for the experiment 
were developed in cooperation with Mapsup.
Figure 2. Players negotiating around the MapTable PSS.
In the PSS, the supply of development plans is visualized using building 
blocks that represent a fixed amount of developments units (Table 2). The 
amount that is represented was chosen to easily alter the supply by each mu-
nicipality. The initially displayed spatial distribution of blocks was modelled 
to match the current supply of both business and housing by each municipal-
ity, both in size and geographical location (Figures 3 and 4).
Figure 3. Initial distribution of supply of business areas. The blue line indicates demand for business 
areas in the corridor. Dashed lines on each bar indicate the single local supply for each municipality.
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Figure 4. Initial distribution of supply of housing. The blue line on both charts indicates demand housing 
in the corridor. Dashed lines on each bar indicate the single local supply for each municipality.
TYPE OF BLOCKS LARGE SMALL
Business area (ha) 5,0 0,5
Housing (no. units) 200 50
Table 2: Representation of housing and business area by visualized types of blocks.
The PSS shows financial effects of a given spatial configuration of spatial 
developments (for both business and housing), by presenting a financial fig-
ure, in Euros, for each municipality separately and an aggregate value for the 
corridor (Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5. Financial impacts for the initial supply distribution for projected business areas.
Figure 6. Financial impacts for the initial supply distribution for projected housing developments.
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Workshop participants used the PSS to assess financial impacts of the 
initial spatial configuration of projected housing and business development, 
negotiate changes, and adjust their individual supply on the MapTable us-
ing their finger or a digital pen. They could either remove blocks, add blocks 
or by moving blocks from one municipality to another (by selecting one or 
more blocks within the municipal boundaries of one player and dragging this 
selection within the boundaries of a target municipality). If the participants 
changed the spatial configuration for spatial development, the financial fig-
ures were automatically reassessed in real time.
Workshop setup and game rounds
The workshops started with an introduction to the study area and the role 
of PSS. Next, a hands-on practice demo and instruction with the MapTable 
Planning Support System (abbreviated underneath simply as PSS) was given, 
which included:
 -  Map layers available in the PSS (municipal boundaries, spatial develop-
ment plans, railway stations, roads, water bodies, aerial photography)
 -  Introduction to working with the library of blocks
 -  Charts showing supply of spatial plans
 -  Charts showing financial revenues for business and housing.
Subsequently, participants carried out four rounds of assignments in 
2.5 hours involving negotiations about downsizing supply of plans (round 1), 
while taking into account public transport (round 2), new railway station de-
velopment (round 3) and introduction of a financial compensation mecha-
nism. The overall goal was to: “Modify the spatial configuration of supply of 
municipal development plans for 2025 using the profits displayed at both the 
individual municipal level and the corridor level”. 
At three moments in the workshop participants filled in a short ques-
tionnaire regarding their expectations about the workshop, and experiences 
with the tool, as illustrated in the timeline of the workshop in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Timeline representing the experiment protocol of one workshop session.
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5. RESULTS: EXPERIENCES FROM PARTICIPANTS
In this section, we describe the experiences from applying the work-
shops. We do this by highlighting the learning experience (section 5.3). How-
ever, first we describe the general observations on the performance of the 
visualisation and financial model (section 5.1) and the differences in process 
and outcomes between the workshops (section 5.2).
 5.1	 General	observations
In general, the fact that the negotiation took place around an interactive 
map proved to be effective. It facilitated a focused form of communication, 
in which financial and spatial negotiations could be combined and supported 
by relevant information in order to come to an agreement. The tool helped 
to identify first steps towards obtaining a better regional adjustment of sup-
ply and demand in municipal locations for development and overcoming the 
common pool resource problem.
Figure 8. Stakeholders pointing to the map during their negotiations. Municipality territories are 
represented by different semi-transparent colours on the map, and the various graphs visualize the 
distribution of supply and demand for housing and office space.
All participants pointed to relevant features on the map in trying to ex-
plain their motives and justify their behaviour (Figure 8). In doing so, they 
used in-depth knowledge of their respective municipalities and brought for-
ward spatial arguments to justify their behaviour. For example, in one of the 
workshops, the municipality of Zevenaar brings forward the importance of 
the international industrial area along the A12 highway, by zooming in on the 
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location, turning on the underlying high-resolution aerial photography, and 
explaining the relevant geographical relation to the highway and the German 
hinterland. 
Nevertheless, some of the participants felt that the broader spatial dis-
cussion on urban development was missing in the workshops. They felt that 
discussion with the tool “become too much of a financial story, and the spatial 
planning aspects are insufficiently discussed”. The participants felt the urge 
to discuss more spatial aspects, look at more background maps, and illustrate 
that with issues, chances and opportunities in their own municipality. The 
set-up of the workshop did, however, force them to focus solely on issues 
related to oversupply. This was felt by the participants as too restrictive. For 
some participants, the financial information seemed to fuel the discussion 
more than the geographical information. Such remarks indicate that the in-
tegration of spatial information (central in geodesign) and financial informa-
tion (put central in this game, using an N-prisoners dilemma conceptualiza-
tion) needs to be balanced.
The relation between the financial model and the spatial information 
must be clear and transparent, according to the participants. They need to be 
aware of the preconditions and assumptions, which information is displayed, 
and which factors are included and excluded in the model, to be able to design 
the outlines of an agreement. As a participant notes in the questionnaire, in 
order for the negotiation to work, “insight in the figures is essential for a real-
istic negotiation”. However, it is especially important for them to realize that 
the financial model simplifies financial relations in the real estate market, 
and that, as such, the exact outcomes are not of great added value. After all, 
the goal of the workshop was not primarily to simulate possible outcomes on 
the basis of a model, but to facilitate a discussion on the issue of oversupply of 
locations. This was clear to the participants, and the workshop was successful 
at it, as illustrated by this quote: “the tool helps to structure the discussion, 
specify each other’s interests and subsequently confront each other”.
 5.2	 Process	and	outcomes
The process and outcomes differed greatly between the two workshops, 
although it has to be stated that participants acknowledged the added value 
of both workshops. 
Workshop with regional participants
In the workshop with the regional and provincial government, the par-
ticipants easily reached an agreement on the amount of development lo-
cations to be supplied. It was commonly agreed that a general decrease of 
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locations would help the financial result of all players, and that the largest 
suppliers should cut back their plans the most. This can be qualified as real-
istic, because of the regional perspective of the players in this workshop in 
which local sensitivities did not play a role: all players more or less acted in 
the common, regional interest. This can also be seen during the workshops: 
the participants displayed active poses and tried to look for possibilities, both 
within and outside their respective, assigned municipalities. 
The iterations in the workshop merely helped to indicate whether the 
common regional interest was being served. The participants decided togeth-
er what the best strategy was to reach the objective of limiting oversupply. 
The participants iteratively explored the limits of the model, and through tri-
al-and-error the objective of limiting the regional oversupply was reached 
and distributed fairly over the different municipalities.
The main outcome of the workshop can be formulated as increased in-
sight in the size and nature of the problem of regional oversupply, and the 
cross-municipal character of it. For now, the regional and provincial author-
ities still feel that the municipalities should solve the problem. After all, “the 
municipalities have caused the problem, they are feeling the consequences of 
it, so they should also increase their effort in solving it”.
Workshop with local participants
For the participants in the workshops with the local municipalities, this 
proved to be different. They could not come to a limitation of the supply of 
development locations. At the end of the negotiation an oversupply of these 
locations still existed. The negotiations with the players from the local mu-
nicipalities had a tougher character in which participants negotiated more 
from a local perspective, serving their own local interests. Each player point-
ed to other municipalities to find solutions for the problem of oversupply. 
They used the map to identify and discuss locations in the neighbouring mu-
nicipalities that otherwise might be overlooked. 
The iterations in the Maptable PSS were used more restrictively than in 
the workshop with regional participants. They applied a drip-feed method, in 
which only small decreases were made to the amount of locations provided. 
Instead, the participants used the Maptable more as a discussion tool for ex-
plicating each other’s position in the negotiation. 
The main outcome of the process was a call for more provincial involve-
ment in formulating overarching spatial policies on regional urban develop-
ment: “the province will have to deliver more tailor-made approaches. They 
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have the instruments to intervene, why not do so? The province should care-
fully assess each municipal plan”. Although the workshop successfully brings 
information together in interactive fashion with plenty of (financial) feed-
back, which can be used by the participants to design solutions to the problem 
of oversupply, this seems not to be sufficient for finding a solution to the 
problem of oversupply in this case study.
 5.3	 Learning
Although the workshops yielded different results as to reaching agree-
ments (see Section 5.2), the added value of the integrated PSS for the various 
tasks was apparent to all players involved. The combination of the interac-
tive map and real-time finances stimulated a discussion of the information. 
Participants questioned each other on the proposed plans and, especially, on 
the motives behind these plans. This is illustrated by remarks made in the 
questionnaire: “The tool effectively brings motives to the surface”, and in 
the plenary discussion: “It is insightful. It relates to the essence of collabo-
ration, which is crucial. It is a good tool to do so”. The information technolo-
gy offered a direct insight in each other’s current situation and future plans. 
Therefore both learning about the position of other stakeholders, as learning 
about the issue at hand (the problem of oversupply in the Liemers corridor) 
occurred (Table 3). 
MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STD. DEVIATION CRONBACH’S A
Learning about other 
participants
1,67 6,67 5,17 1,21 0,74
Learning about the 
issue
2,67 6,33 5,26 5,26 0,92
Table 3. Results of the objective to learn about others and the object at hand (N = 14; On a 7-point Likert 
scale with 1 = strongly disagree; and 7 = strongly agree)
The participants stressed that the tool effectively linked financial and 
spatial negotiations, which are usually taking place in separated arenas. The 
players used both the map and the financial data provided in the negotiation 
process. Especially the information from other municipalities, often belong-
ing to other regions, proved to be useful. As one participant explains: “The 
extra information of the spatial element of the corridor versus the region is 
underdeveloped in negotiations in practice. That is information from another 
area and therefore usually invisible. As a municipality, you spend too little 
time looking around you to find out where the organizations and develop-
ments are that are essential for the success of your own plans”. 
R
IU
S 4: G
EO
-D
ESIG
N
88
The differences between the negotiation results of the workshops could 
point to the conclusion that the participants display real behaviour. The real-
istic character of the integrated workshop seems to trigger the behaviour that 
can also be observed in practice: at a regional level, one can find a solution 
for oversupply, but at the local level this seems much harder. The realistic 
character of the workshop was also stressed in the plenary discussion: “The 
workshop was very insightful. It is close to reality. It is not a fictive case, with 
the map and the locations. I think that helps a lot: you have to make it real”.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this article, we tested the applicability of facilitating both geodesign 
and game theory in an integrated workshop. We explored this for the Dutch 
case of oversupply of planned sites for urban development in the Liemers cor-
ridor. We specifically examined the way in which the integrated workshop can 
stimulate learning. 
We can conclude that the combination of game theory and geodesign 
provides added value for planning support: it creates a realistic discussion 
and negotiation strongly connected to real-life locations, aimed at designing 
a common, regional solution. Participants learn about the problem and about 
each other through the provided interactive geographical and financial infor-
mation. 
The interactive tool especially proved to work well for generating insight 
in and learning about the issue at hand and each other’s motivation. The in-
tegration of geodesign and game theory therefore helps to add the contextu-
al discussion of geodesign to game theory, while simultaneously it adds the 
financial strategic behaviour of game theory to the geodesign. The results, 
in the form of the distribution of locations and financial outcomes, merely 
served for making the negotiation more realistic, stronger spatially grounded 
and better supported by facts. The greatest added value lies in the insight gen-
erated in the process behind the outcome: e.g. how do municipalities interact, 
react to each other, and respond to changing circumstances? This seems to 
be in line with Lee (1994) and Te Brömmelstroet (2012), who argue that some 
problems are better approached through broad generalizations than through 
detailed models. This should be taken into account when considering the 
greatest disadvantages of the integrated workshops: the models applied offer 
a considerable (financial) simplification of reality. Therefore, the outcomes of 
the negotiations can only be used at a very general level. 
In addition, the transferability of the integrated workshop is currently 
limited because the game-theoretical model is only applicable to settings in 
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which an N-person prisoners’ dilemma occurs. In its current form, it can only 
be used to analyse strategic behaviour in such settings. However, the inte-
grated workshop may serve as an initial evidence of the possibility to inte-
grate game-theoretical modelling and experiment with geodesign. By chang-
ing the structural variations in the game-theoretical model, we can analyse 
different situations. Moreover, we can also increase the complexity of a game 
in order to make it closer to reality. We strongly believe that the integration of 
game-theoretical modelling with geodesign may offer a promising approach 
for analysing complex urban development processes, because it particularly 
can take into account a specific interdependent situation among stakehold-
ers in the process and the results of the analysis can be validated empirically 
through experiments with real stakeholders as we have done in this research.
Based on our work, several avenues for further research can be distin-
guished. The first is a further exploration of the potential of this tool. The tool 
proved to be useful in the first stages of a negotiation process, when infor-
mation needs to be communicated efficiently. The application of the PSS in a 
later stage would require more in-depth information, and more sophisticated 
financial and spatial modelling. A second avenue is to broaden the sector in 
which the tool is applied. A cross-sectoral comparison could help to iden-
tify crucial preconditions in negotiations: e.g. what is the challenge central 
in a specific context and situation, which information is necessary for deci-
sion-making, how many players can be included in the strategic process, how 
could the strategic social interactions be included in the geodesign-negotia-
tion-game workshop, and how can the problem best be visualized in the PSS.
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